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PLANNING, ZONING AND SUBDIVISION LAW
Woodrow W. Turner, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The philosophy which guided the Supreme Court of Virginia in
reviewing land use cases in the decade of the 1970's is exemplified
by the Court's reasoning in Fairfax County v. Snell Corp.:1
The statutes recognize that public power over private property
rights should be exercised judiciously and equitably. That policy
springs not only from public respect for personal rights and individ-
ual integrity but also from enlightened public self-interest. The
General Assembly has recognized that it is in the public interest
that private land not required for public use be put to its optimum
use to fulfill societal needs .... Under the private enterprise sys-
tem, land use is influenced by the profit motive. Profit flows from
investments of time, talent, and capital. Landowners venture invest-
ments only when the prospects of profit are reasonable. Prospects
are reasonable only when permissible land use is reasonably
predictable.2
At the beginning of the 1990's, however, land use decisions made
by local governments and the Virginia General Assembly and con-
flicts in decisions between the federal and state courts leave the
outcome of land use cases far from predictable. Decisions in 1989
and 1990 at each of these levels of government evidence a power
struggle over where the ultimate authority over land use decisions
in Virginia will rest. At stake are the limits of public power over
* Partner, Law Offices of Woodrow W. Turner, Jr., Leesburg, Virginia; B.A., 1965, Emory
University; J.D., 1973, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The
author acknowledges the valuable resource provided by two important seminars held
throughout Virginia during the year: "Contemporary Land Use Law Issues for Virginia
Practitioners" presented by the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the Virginia
Law Foundation (1990); and, "Land Use Law and Planning in Virginia" presented by the
Cambridge Institute (1990).
1. 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
2. Id. at 657-58, 202 S.E.2d at 892. Two decades later, in 1990, the Supreme Court of
Virginia followed Snell in overturning another piecemeal downzoning action. City of Vir-
ginia Beach v. Virginia Land Inv. Ass'n, 239 Va. 412, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990). See infra text
accompanying notes 24-32.
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private property rights and a determination of which public arm of
government will exercise the public's power. As will be demon-
strated in this survey article, this struggle has resulted in a me-
lange of decisions and legislative enactments.
This survey of planning, zoning and subdivision law discusses
significant cases decided recently by the circuit courts of Virginia
and by the various federal courts sitting in Virginia. It also reviews
important statutory changes made to the Code of Virginia (the
"Code") in the most recent session of the General Assembly.
In the opening round of the turf battles, the General Assembly
this year asserted its prerogative by enacting several bills re-
claiming authority which had traditionally been the function of lo-
cal governments. One such bill established a permanent Commis-
sion on Population Growth and Development,3 and charged the
Commission with the preparation of a state-level comprehensive
plan which, if implemented by a future Legislature, could signifi-
cantly reduce the planning and zoning authority which presently
rests with local governments.4
Another bill, discussed below, retroactively struck down a
downzoning action of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County.'
A third bill stripped localities of their power to change permitted
land uses where substantial conditions have been proffered as part
of a rezoning.
By contrast this year local governments sought and obtained
more authority from the General Assembly in the areas of environ-
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-145.11.2 (Supp. 1990).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-145.11; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT, (H. Doc. No. 40 (1990)). The responsibilities of this Commission appar-
ently will be expanded beyond water quality issues related to the restrictions of the Chesa-
peake Bay Preservation Act to include the development of more stringent growth manage-
ment and environmental protection measures which would apply statewide. See id. In
support of its recommendation for expanded State control, the Commission stated:
Where growth is occurring very rapidly, and especially where land management tools
may not be well institutionalized, local governments may be unable to keep pace with
the development of needed infrastructure. Then, instead of the locality's comprehen-
sive plan and capital facilities program leading the direction of development in an
orderly fashion, independent developer decisions may become the guiding growth
force in the area.
Id. at 9.
5. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1372.1 to .13 (Supp. 1990); see infra text accompanying
notes 19-23.
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491, -491.2, -491.2:1; see infra text accompanying notes 70-
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mental protection,7 incentives for the construction of affordable
housing,8 and subdivision control.9 Moreover, an ad hoc subcom-
mittee composed of members of the General Assembly and citizens
has been established to study proposed land use legislation which
was not adopted or which was carried over to the 1991 General
Assembly. These bills are aimed at the adoption of a comprehen-
sive vesting law,'0 a law limiting the use of special exceptions," a
law permitting phased growth through adequate public facilities'
requirements, 2 a law permitting transfer of development rights,3
and a law permitting impact fees for schools and other public
facilities.' 4
The activity in the courts this year was also contradictory. The
Supreme Court of Virginia struck down a piecemeal downzoning
by the City of Virginia Beach 5 and upheld a citizens' referendum
nullifying a rezoning action of the City Council of Chesapeake.'
The court also struck down involuntarily imposed conditions in a
rezoning action by the Fairfax City Council.17 By comparison, the
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld cases where the legislative ac-
tion was tested against the "fairly debatable" rule.'
The federal courts are becoming more of a factor in Virginia
land use decisions, and in constitutional cases appear willing to af-
ford a high degree of protection for property rights.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489(8).
8. See id. § 15.1-446.1, -447, -489(10), -491.9.
9. Id. § 15.1-466A(c), 466-A(f), -466(G), -480.1.
10. H.B. 1121, 1122, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990); see infra note 77 and accom-
panying text.
11. H.B. 677, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
12. H.B. 987, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
13. H.B. 164, S.B. 228, S.B. 359, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
14. S.B. 48, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990) (amending the charter of Chesterfield);
S.B. 304 Va. Gen. Assembly, Sess. (1990) (dealing with road improvements).
15. Virginia Beach, 239 Va. 412, 289 S.E.2d 312; see infra text accompanying notes 24-32.
16. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Comm. for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 239 Va.
484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
17. Rinker v. City of Fairfax, 238 Va. 24, 381 S.E.2d 215 (1989); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 104-109.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 132-42.
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II. DOWNZONING
A. Fairfax County Downzoning Actions
In one action, the General Assembly retroactively overturned a
downzoning effort by the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors to
reduce the available development potential and density on certain
industrially and commercially zoned land which is located, in part,
in the Route 28 special taxing district.19
On December 11, 1989, the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors
adopted an ordinance which reduced, by as much as one-half, the
amount of development permitted by right on more than 14,000
acres of land zoned commercial and industrial. 0 The ordinance
prohibited what was formerly by-right office construction on the
affected properties.2' The purpose of the downzoning was to give
the county greater control over the uses and permitted densities on
the affected properties so that the county could regulate more ef-
fectively the development's perceived impact on traffic. Over 250
law suits were filed in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County by af-
fected property owners challenging the downzoning. These cases
are currently pending.
Despite the pending litigation, the Virginia General Assembly
invalidated the action of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors
in a controversial and celebrated legislative decision which retroac-
tively reversed the downzoning to the extent that it applied to
properties located within the Route 28 Corridor Tax District.2
This action, if sustained in the courts,23 will effectively vest per-
mitted uses and densities for property located in the Route 28 Tax
District.
B. The Virginia Beach Downzoning Cases
A similar local government action occurred in the City of Vir-
ginia Beach where the City Council downzoned certain property
located within the city, changing the use from planned unit, high
19. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1372.1 to .13 (Supp. 1990).
20. Fairfax County, Va., Zoning Ordinance Amendment - (Dec. 11, 1989).
21. Id.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1372.1 to .13.
23. This new provision of the Code has survived the first round in the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County where the trial judge in an oral ruling from the bench rejected the County's
constitutional challenge. In Re: Zoning Ordinance Amendment, No. 115184 (Fairfax County
Cir. Ct. 1990).
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density development to conservation and farming. Again, the
downzoning was invalidated-this time by the courts. In City of
Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment Association
(VLIA),24 the Supreme Court of Virginia sustained the trial court's
determination that the zoning action was "piecemeal" and not
"comprehensive" as was argued by the city.25 The trial court con-
cluded that the City Council's action was not comprehensive be-
cause it downzoned only certain parcels and permitted others simi-
larly situated to retain their prior zoning status.26
The court applied the long-standing rule established in Board of
Supervisors v. Snell Corporation. Snell established that in a
downzoning case, the threshold question is whether the action of
the government was comprehensive or piecemeal.28 If the action is
found to be comprehensive, the "fairly debatable" rule applies,
which requires that the legislative action be sustained if evidence
would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach different con-
clusions. 29 In the case of a piecemeal downzoning where only a lim-
ited number of parcels or area of land is rezoned, the standard is
much more restrictive. In such cases, the property owner need only
make a prima facia case that since the enactment of the prior ordi-
nance there has been no change in circumstances "substantially af-
fecting the public health, safety, or welfare.""0 Then, the burden
shifts to the government to demonstrate fraud, mistake or changed
circumstances justifying its zoning change."' In the Virginia Beach
downzoning, there was no such evidence presented, and the prop-
erty owner prevailed.2
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND FEDERAL COURTS
A. Citizen Involvement
The rationale used by state courts in deciding constitutional
rights' cases is in clear contrast to the approach taken by the fed-
24. 239 Va. 412, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990).
25. Id. at 417, 389 S.E.2d at 314.
26. Id.
27. 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (i974).
28. Id. at 658-59, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
29. Id. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 239 Va. at 417, 389 S.E.2d at 314.
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eral courts in Marks v. City of Chesapeake.3 In Marks, the City of
Chesapeake denied a conditional use permit for the operation of a
palmistry. Marks filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief, compensation and punitive dam-
ages. He claimed the city's denial of his permit application was ar-
bitrary and capricious and, hence, a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law.34 The federal district court abstained
pending Marks' exhaustion of available state court remedies.
Marks then filed suit in the Circuit Court for the City of Chesa-
peake which dismissed the case finding that under Virginia law a
"City Council has wide discretion in the issuance of permits" and
that Marks "failed to satisfy his burden of proof to establish that
the actions of the City Council in this matter were clearly arbitrary
and capricious. ' 3" Marks then returned to federal court renewing
his federal claim. The federal trial court reached the conclusion
that the City Council had indeed acted arbitrarily in denying
Marks' permit application. 6 The court granted nominal damages
and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1988, ordered the city to pay Marks'
attorney's fees and costs.3 7 The court determined that the city offi-
cials had succumbed to irrational neighborhood pressure founded
on religious prejudice in deciding to deny the application. "As a
general matter, therefore, the public's negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zon-
ing proceeding, are not permissible bases for local officials' land
use decisions. '38
The Marks case is in stark contrast to the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision in West v. Mills. 9 In West, the trial court heard
evidence and argument regarding the disapproval of a subdivision
plat and concluded that "the members of this commission evi-
dently were intimidated by these people who spoke in opposi-
tion. . . .I know exactly why these plans were not approved, pres-
sure from people who owned some homes around close or in the
neighborhood."4 Although the decision rested on state land use
law rather than constitutional issues, the state trial court found
33. 883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989).
34. Id. at 309-10.
35. Id. at 310.
36. Id. at 311.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 311.
39. 238 Va. 162, 380 S.E.2d 917 (1989).
40. Id. at 167, 380 S.E.2d at 920.
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the disapproval of the subdivision was arbitrary and capricious and
ordered the plat to be approved. 41 The Supreme Court of Virginia,
"keep[ing] in mind that the members of the Planning Commission
are presumed to have acted correctly," reversed the decision of the
trial court concluding that "the evidence is insufficient to support
the trial court's finding that citizen pressure was the unstated rea-
son for the commission's disapproval of the . . . plat.
' 42
Citizen involvement was also the subject of another Supreme
Court of Virginia case. R. G. Moore Building Corp. v. Committee
for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-1343 involved the charter of
the City of Chesapeake which permits any new ordinance to be
approved by the electorate pursuant to a referendum. Under the
City of Chesapeake's charter, any ordinance which is passed by the
City Council remains ineffective for thirty days during which a pe-
tition of fifteen percent of the electorate can be filed." If filed, the
ordinance will then become effective only after it has been modi-
fied by the City Council or approved by the electorate in a referen-
dum. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's
decision that the referendum provision applied to zoning ordinance
amendments." It then found that a popular vote by the citizens
did not involve an improper or unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to the electorate.4" The court rejected the landowner's
argument that application of the referendum provision to rezoning
ordinances would result in piecemeal alterations of the city's com-
prehensive plan because the referendum could not be used to initi-
ate rezonings but only to repeal or amend them.47 In addition, the
court found no constitutional due process violation in the proce-
dure, finding that the plaintiff has potential relief from the refer-
endum result through a variance procedure or a court challenge to
the reasonableness of the referendum result itself. 48
Another federal case of interest is Beacon Hill Farm Associates
II, Ltd. v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors.49 In this case, a
developer's challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
41. Id.
42. Id. at 168, 380 S.E.2d at 921.
43. 239 Va. 484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
44. Id. at 486-87, 391 S.E.2d at 588.
45. Id. at 489, 391 S.E.2d at 589.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 490, 391 S.E.2d at 590.
48. Id. at 493, 391 S.E.2d at 591-92.
49. 875 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1989).
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regulating mountainside development was determined by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to be ripe for adjudication.
The Fourth Circuit held that it was not necessary to determine the
application of the ordinance to a specific piece of property and
that a facial attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance should
have been heard by the lower district court. °
B. Takings
Interestingly, three recent "takings" decisions involving the
question of whether temporary takings are compensable, elicited
different results. A federal court and a Virginia circuit court found
a temporary taking to be compensable, but the Supreme Court of
Virginia reached a contrary conclusion.
In Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v.
Town of Front Royal,5 ' the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, relying on Virginia constitutional law
in Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,52 and upon First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,5" held that a
temporary deprivation of use due to an illegal withholding of sewer
service was a compensable taking of property. 4 The court found
that the property was worth "so much less that [the landowners]
have been deprived of property rights. Therefore, this court finds,
as a matter of law, that there was a taking for which Plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation." 55 In Front Royal, the landowner was
temporarily deprived of the use of public utilities and, as a result,
his property could not be used for its highest and best use for de-
velopment. Although not discussed, it is implicit in the opinion
that the property owner could have used his land by leasing it or
selling it during the time he was denied the right to use the sewer
facilities.
A similar approach was used by the trial court in Board of Su-
pervisors v. Thompson Associates.5 6 The court found the county's
request for a service road, exacted as a condition of site plan ap-
50. Id. at 1085.
51. 708 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D. Va. 1989).
52. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
53. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
54. Front Royal, 708 F. Supp. at 1484.
55. Id.
56. 12 Va. Cir. 318 (Fairfax County 1988), rev'd on other grounds, Record No. 891329
(June 8, 1990).
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proval, to be an unconstitutional taking. Relying upon the Virginia
trilogy of Hylton v. Prince William County, Cupp v. Board of
Supervisors," and James City County v. Rowe,59 the court held
that the county's actions were "per se" unconstitutional and be-
yond its powers under the Dillon rule. Relying upon First English
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,60 the court then
held that the county was liable for pecuniary damages and attor-
neys fees under federal civil rights statutes. The trial court ordered
the county to issue building permits which had been withheld and
to return bond money which had been seized, but the trial court
did not award money damages, however, because the owner failed
to give the county the required statutory notice of claim pursuant
to section 15.1-554 of the Code.6 1 On appeal the Supreme Court of
Virginia did not reach the takings or damages questions, ruling in-
stead that the entire action was barred because the property owner
failed to utilize the statutory appeals process available under sec-
tions 15.1-475 and 15.1-496.1 of the Code, and because the owner
waited nine years after the road improvement condition was im-
posed to file-well beyond the statute of limitations.2
By contrast, in the Virginia Beach downzoning case63 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia concluded that although the landowner
was deprived of the use of his land for higher density development
during the time it was downzoned to agricultural use, no tempo-
rary regulatory taking of the property occurred. The supreme court
found that: "At best, VLIA can only show that it was unable to
develop its property as a planned unit development. VLIA, how-
ever, was able to lease its property after it was downzoned. The
city's ordinance did not constitute a taking because VLIA was not
deprived of all economically viable use of its property. 6 4
Justice Lacy, in a concurring opinion, found that, "An unconsti-
tutional taking or damage did not occur in this case because the
57. 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
58. 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d 407 (1984).
59. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
60. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
61. Thompson Associates, 12 Va. Cir. at 324-25.
62. Thompson Associates, No. 891329, slip op. at 6.
63. City of Virginia Beach v. VLIA, 239 Va. 412, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990).
64. Id. at 416-17, 389 S.E.2d at 314. Notably, none of the United States Supreme Court
"takings" cases decided in 1987 (Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenectis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)) were
cited by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
1990]
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owner was not deprived of the use of or right to sell the land. Dim-
inution and salability or potential market value does not rise to the
level of a constitutional taking or damage to the property." 5 If the
same reasoning were applied to the Front Royal case, there would
be no taking, because in Front Royal, like in Virginia Beach, the
landowner was not deprived of his ability to sell or lease his
property.
IV. VESTED RIGHTS
The issue of where in the development process rights become
protected from changes in land use regulations is unsettled for the
most part in Virginia. The steps in the land development process
generally proceed as follows: zoning or rezoning approval; special
or conditional use permit approval; subdivision approval; site plan
and grading approval; and, finally, issuance of a building permit.
When new limits are placed on how property can be used, such as
reducing allowable density, restricting allowable uses, reducing
floor/area ratios, reducing height limitations, or increasing lot size
requirements, the development potential and the value of the
property can be strikingly curtailed. In turn, reasonable invest-
ment backed expectations of property owners can be frustrated.
These actions are commonly but imprecisely called downzonings.
When an actual downzoning occurs, Virginia law is fairly well set-
tled: "The Virginia landowner always confronts the possibility that
permissible land use may be changed by a comprehensive zoning
ordinance reducing profit prospects; yet, the Virginia statutes as-
sure him that such a change will not be made suddenly, arbitrarily,
or capriciously but only after a period of investigation and commu-
nity planning."66
65. Id. at 419-20, 389 S.E.2d at 316. Justice Lacy cited Bartz v. Bd. of Supervisors, 237
Va. 669, 379 S.E.2d 356 (1989) where the court held that the filing of a condemnation pro-
ceeding and a memorandum of lis pendens does not constitute a taking because the owner
can still sell or use his land pending the outcome of the condemnation proceeding." Id. at
673, 379 S.E.2d at 360.
66. Fairfax County v. Snell Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974). An attack
on a downzoning action is essentially a facial attack on the ordinance itself. A facial attack
on other land use ordinances that reduce development potential arguably should obtain the
same result. If a locality were to enact a "piecemeal" change in other development regula-
tions such as subdivision control, site planning, site development, grading or even building
plans, the rationale in Snell would logically apply. To date, Snell has only been applied in
zoning cases. See e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. VLIA, 239 Va 412, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990).
In Harrison v. Robinson, Record No. 860952 (1989), an unreported memorandum opinion
that is not to be cited or relied upon as precedent in any case, the Supreme Court of Vir-
[Vol. 24:691
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Vesting cases are different from downzoning cases in that it is
assumed that the land use change itself is valid and the question is
what happens to those property owners who are already in the pro-
cess of developing when the law was changed. At what stage of this
process can the local government compel compliance with the new
rule, and when is the property owner allowed to continue under
the old rule?67 It is clear from two 1972 cases in the Supreme
Court of Virginia that where a property owner has incurred sub-
stantial expense and diligently pursued in good faith the develop-
ment of his property in accordance with an approved special use or
conditional use permit, he is protected from intervening govern-
mental rezoning actions which change the permitted use.6 Beyond
these limited situations, however, there was little statutory or case
law guidance in the area of vested property rights until this year.6
A. Legislative Action
1. Rezonings with Proffered Conditions
In a broadly applicable amendment to the Conditional Zoning
(Proffer) sections of the Code, the legislature "vested" develop-
ment rights in rezoned property where substantial conditions have
been proffered as part of the rezoning.70 Under the amendments, if
proffered conditions include a requirement for the dedication of
real property of substantial value, or substantial cash payments for
or construction of substantial public improvements, the need for
which is not generated solely by the rezoning itself, then the zoning
ginia discussed the distinction between zoning and subdivision concepts. It said that subdi-
vision laws are aimed more at the "safe use of property, the minimization of health and
other hazards, and placing the burden of safe development upon developers and not upon
the local government." Harrison, mem. op. at 11. The court cautioned that because the
related concepts of zoning and subdivisions differ in their aims, cases from one area cannot
be applied "in wholesale fashion" to problems in the other area. Id. Nevertheless, because
the Snell rule will validate a change in the zoning ordinance based upon a change in circum-
stances "substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare," it should be useful in
analyzing other ordinance changes where property rights have been adversely affected.
67. Frequently localities will, as a matter of "legislative grace," make this determination
by establishing a "grandfather clause" which exempts from the new law property owners
already in the development process. For a complete discussion of vested rights, see Hanes &
Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373
(1989).
68. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972);
Bd. of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
69. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-492, -473(c), 10.1-2115 (Repl. Vol. 1989) (protecting
pre-existing uses but not providing guidance as to pre-construction vesting).
70. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491, -491.2, -491.2:1 (Supp. 1990).
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for the property subject to such conditions and the conditions
themselves become vested. 71 After the rezoning is approved, no
changes which eliminate or materially restrict, reduce, or modify
the uses, floor area ratio, or the density of such property can be
imposed by the locality unless there has been a mistake, fraud or a
change in circumstance substantially affecting the public health,
safety or welfare.72
Landowners who have made such proffers before July 1, 1990,
but have not substantially implemented them by that date have
until July 1, 1991, to inform the governing body of their intent to
proceed with implementation of the proffers. Thereafter, any land-
owner giving such notice has until July 1, 1995, to substantially
implement the proffers. The landowner is then required to dili-
gently pursue the completion of development of the property.73
These provisions are prospective only, and do not apply to any
zoning ordinance text amendments adopted prior to March 10,
1990.74
2. Property in Special Tax Districts
As previously discussed, the General Assembly retroactively re-
versed the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors' action which
downzoned a number of properties along the Route 28 develop-
ment corridor.75 The legislation effectively "vested" for a period of
fifteen years provisions of all zoning ordinance text and regulations
(which were in force on the date the tax district was created) relat-
ing to commercial and industrial properties in the district. Except
with the consent of the owner, no change can thereafter be made
to provisions for such properties which reduce, limit or restrict al-
lowable uses, densities, setbacks, building heights, required park-
ing and open space.76
3. Legislation Carried Over
Several other legislative proposals dealing with vested rights
were carried over to the 1991 Session and, along with other land
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1372.3(C) (Supp. 1990).
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use bills, are being studied by an ad hoc sub-committee of the
General Assembly. 7
7
B. Court Action
The Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County, in Whelan v. Spot-
sylvania County Planning Commission,7 held that the submission
of a preliminary plat, as distinguished from the approval thereof,
does not as a matter of law confer a vested right upon the land-
owner to use his property as shown on the plat.70 The trial court
sustained the action of the county in downzoning (reducing the al-
lowable density of) the developer's property.80 The case, decided
on summary judgment motions, held only that the landowner had
no vested right to the existing zoning.81 The question of whether
the landowner's claim that its subdivision application was treated
differently than other subdivision applications similarly situated
after the downzoning occurred was left for factual determination
by the court.2
In Dominion Lands, Inc. v. City of Alexandria,83 the circuit
court held that once a site plan is approved, vested rights are ac-
quired: "Under current planning practice, the site plan has virtu-
ally replaced the building permit as the most vital document in the
development process. When the site plan is approved, the building
permit, except in rare situations, will be issued. The landowner
cannot be deprived of such use by subsequent legislation. '8 4
A federal district court in Cooke, Inc. v. County of Louisa,85 held
that a subdivider has no vested right to record a subdivision which
had been prepared but which was neither recorded nor approved
by the county prior to a change in the county's subdivision regula-
77. H.B. 1121, 1122, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990), would legislatively define
vested rights. H.B. 880, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990), entitled Approval of Pro-
posed Subdivision Plats and Site Plans (Counties, Cites and Towns), would carry a pre-
sumption of approval of plats and site plans if the local jurisdiction failed to take any gov-
ernmental action for sixty days (or for seventy-five days if review by state agencies was
required).
78. 15 Va. Cir. 271, 274 (Spotsylvania County 1989).
79. See id. at 274.
80. See id. 273-75.
81. Id. at 275.
82. Id.
83. No. 18,106 (City of Alexandria Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1988) (Itr. op).
84. Id. at 2.
85. No. 89-0017-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 1990) (mem. op), afl'd, No. -, (4th Cir. 1990).
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tions. The landowner's previously prepared subdivision did not
comply with the amended ordinance and the clerk refused to ac-
cept it for recordation. The subdivider then filed suit alleging that
his rights were vested and that he had been discriminated
against. s6 The case turned on a review of section 15.1-473(C) of the
Code exempting subdivisions "lawfully created prior to the adop-
tion of a subdivision ordinance applicable thereto. 8 7 The court
found the subdivision had not been lawfully created and that the
county had acted properly in amending its subdivision ordinance.88
V. USE (OR ABUSE) OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AS A GROWTH
MANAGEMENT TOOL
Local governments have authority through their comprehensive
planning functions to make decisions about the expansion of pub-
lic utilities. Section 15.1-456 of the Code ("section 456"), entitled
Legal Status of Plan, provides that after a local jurisdiction adopts
its comprehensive plan, no future street, public area, public build-
ing or utility facility which is not shown on the plan shall be con-
structed, established or authorized unless and until the general lo-
cation, character and extent has been approved by the local
Planning Commission as being substantially in accord with the
adopted plan. 9 This section provides a potent tool for manage-
ment of growth by local governments. The ability to control utili-
ties and other public facilities carries with it the control and tim-
irig of development. By requiring that utility extensions be
consistent with the comprehensive plan, local jurisdictions argua-
bly may be able to utilize timing constraints which the courts have
nullified under previous zoning authority.90
A recent Fairfax County action has demonstrated the usefulness
of this section of the Code to one local jurisdiction. In NVLand,
Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,91 the Circuit Court of Fairfax County
upheld the county's denial of a developer's application under sec-
tion 456 for extension of the county owned sewer facilities. 92 Sewer
86. Id. at IV-42.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-473(C) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
88. Cooke Inc., No. 89-0017-R, mem. op. at IV-50.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-456(a) (Supp. 1990).
90. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975); Bd. of Supervi-
sors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
91. No. 105,959 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct. April 4, 1990) (ltr. op.).
92. Id.
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service was required in order for the developer to utilize the prop-
erty for its proposed cluster development. In the same application,
the developer sought a special exception which was required under
the zoning ordinance to allow the cluster development. The Board
of Supervisors reviewed and denied the applications and the devel-
oper filed suit.9 3 Granting partial summary judgment for the
county, the court held that the county's decision to deny extension
of its sewer service system into a new area beyond the boundaries
planned for development was, as matter of law, a discretionary leg-
islative action and not a proprietary or ministerial decision as ar-
gued by the landowner."4
The property owner contended that the denial of a section 456
application can only be based upon utility related proprietary rea-
sons. The court held, however, that section 456 applications, when
tied to other land use applications "as a package" involving consid-
erations of the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance, as
well as the integrated sewer system, are not ministerial.9 5 The
court determined that the "fairly debatable standard" would apply
to review the reasonableness of legislative actions involving section
456 reviews.96
In another case involving section 456 review, the Circuit Court of
Prince William County reached a different result. In William E.
Meyers v. Board of Zoning Appeals,97 the court held that where
existing zoning allows high density development through utiliza-
tion of public sewer and water, section 456 approval is not required
to extend utilities even if the comprehensive plan has designated
the area for lower density development without public sewer and
water. 8 In this case, the Prince William County Zoning Adminis-
trator denied approval of the developer's preliminary subdivision
plan because water and sewer extensions were not contemplated or
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2, 3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2. A similar result was reached in the case of Caleb Stowe Associates v. County
of Albemarle, 724 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1984), where the county denied approval of a site plan
because the extension of public utilities to the property was not "substantially in accord
with the Comprehensive Plan's recommended location for such sewage facilities." Id. at
1080. The property was zoned for residential development, but recent revisions to the Com-
prehensive Plan had designated its use for rural agricultural. The Federal District Court
held that the Board's action was proper and within its statutory authority. Id. at 1080. This
decision was vacated by the Fourth Circuit invoking the abstention doctrine. Id.
97. No. 2581 (Prince William County Cir. Ct. 1988) (mem. op.).
98. Id.
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shown on the comprehensive plan. Therefore, the zoning adminis-
trator ruled the property could not be developed at the density
submitted without an application pursuant to section 456, which
had not been done by the developer. The court disagreed stating
"that the zoning on the property takes precedence over the Com-
prehensive Plan, and that by the established practice of the
County and the expressed provisions of the statute, they are not
required to have to undergo the public hearings required by § 15.1-
456."11 Further, the court ruled that "the proposed extension of
the water and sewer to the subject property in the manner pro-
posed is more in keeping with a normal service extension than the
major or substantial changes contemplated by the Statute."'00
Finally, in another case involving an annexation order rather
than a section 456 review, Front Royal and Warren County Indus-
trial Park Corporation v. Town of Front Royal,'01 the federal dis-
trict court held that the town's failure to connect municipal sewer
service to the landowners' property denied the landowners their
civil rights, equal protection, and constituted a taking of their
property.' 2 In this case, the obligation to provide public utilities
was specifically and clearly required by an annexation order and
no discretionary legislative function was found to be available to
assist the town. 10
VI. CONDITIONAL ZONING
A. Court Action
The case of Rinker v. City of Fairfax10 4 appears to settle the
question of whether jurisdictions which derive their conditional
zoning powers under section 15.1-491(a) of the Code can impose
conditions in a rezoning without the voluntary consent of the af-
fected property owner. The landowner in Rinker had proffered
seven conditions on his rezoning application, but added an eighth
proffer which stated that the seven previous proffers would be nul-
lified if, after the proffers were submitted, the city implemented a
new comprehensive zoning ordinance. 05 Just after the proffers had
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 708 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D. Va. 1989).
102. Id. at 1487-88.
103. Id. at 1486.
104. 238 Va. 24, 381 S.E.2d 215 (1989).
105. Id. at 26-27, 381 S.E.2d at 215-16.
[Vol. 24:691
ZONING AND SUBDIVISION LAW
been offered to the Planning Commission, the City Council, in
turn, amended the zoning ordinance to reclassify the property
owner's property. The amendment included a new provision which
imposed six conditions, some of which had been the subject of the
initial proffers, on the property.106 The parties agreed for the pur-
poses of demurrer that the proffers had been withdrawn by the
time the revision of the zoning ordinance occurred, thus making
the conditions of the zoning involuntary. In dealing with section
15.1-491(a), which does not contain the word "voluntary," the
court interpreted that section to require "that the proffer shall be
voluntary.' 107 For its authority, the court cited section 15.1-491.2
of the Code which pertains to general enabling legislation permit-
ting conditional zoning throughout the Commonwealth which does
contain the word "voluntary."' 0 8
The supreme court in Rinker also reversed the trial court's rul-
ing that the landowner had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, stating that:
[T]he landowner in this case has fully run the legislative gauntlet
once [seeking rezoning], and in the midst of the process there was a
comprehensive revision of the City's Zoning Ordinance. Under those
circumstances, however, the owner is not required to resort to the
legislative process a second time before being permitted to challenge
the restrictions being placed on the use of its property, especially
when it sought to protect itself against the adverse effect of the an-
ticipated revision."'' 09
B. Legislative Actions
The 1990 General Assembly amended the conditional zoning sec-
tions of the Code to vest development rights in connection with
rezonings where substantial conditions have been proffered as part
of the rezoning." 0
106. Id.
107. 238 Va. at 29, 381 S.E.2d at 217.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 30, 381 S.E.2d at 218.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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VII. SUBDIVISIONS
A. Legislative Actions
Responding to pressure from some high-growth jurisdictions
which cited alleged abuses to the use of family subdivisions by
landowners who were perceived as circumventing the intent of the
various subdivision ordinances of those localities, the General As-
sembly approved a change in the "family subdivision" section of
the Code. The amendment now authorizes local governments to es-
tablish more stringent regulations for family subdivisions in areas
of Virginia where population growth exceeds ten percent or more
from 1980 to the most recent year."' The change effectively per-
mits these jurisdictions to avoid the otherwise state-wide require-
ment that a subdivision ordinance liberally permit divisions among
family members and is an indication of the legislature's willingness
in some instances to grant greater local authority to those areas of
the state which are experiencing rapid population growth and
pressure.
The legislature also adopted provisions authorizing counties to
exercise more control in reviewing subdivisions plans to assure the
coordination of proposed streets with existing or planned streets in
adjacent or contiguous subdivisions." 2 Further, the legislature pro-
vided for subdivision ordinances to permit the creation of common
or shared easements for public utilities 1 and added a new method
for vacation of plats and interests granted to the governing body in
connection with the approval of a site plan." 4
B. Court Actions
In West v. Mills," 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia found that
the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to rule that a denial of a
subdivision plat by the Town of Blacksburg was arbitrary and ca-
pricious because it was based on public sentiment rather than the
provisions of the ordinance." 6 The court relied on the presumptive
validity of the town's action and stated that there was sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the denial was based on applicable
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466G (Supp. 1990).
112. Id. § 15.1-466A(c).
113. Id. § 15.1-466A(fl).
114. Id. § 15.1-480.1.
115. 238 Va. 162, 380 S.E.2d 917 (1989).
116. Id. at 169, 380 S.E.2d at 921.
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ordinance provisions rather than public sentiment.117 The court
also found that the trial court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus
compelling the town to consider another plat regarding the same
property when the denial of a previous plat was the subject of an
appeal. The court held that simultaneous consideration of two in-
consistent plats for the same property by a court and an adminis-
trative body could produce conflicting results as to which plat
should be recorded.
118
In Crestar Bank v. Martin,"9 the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
cided that a transfer of land to a family member which was exempt
under the family-member provision of the local subdivision ordi-
nance was, nevertheless, subject to the controls of the zoning ordi-
nance. In this case, the Martins' conveyance of part of their land to
their daughters was held to be valid.'2 0 However, the resulting use,
erection of a mobile home, violated the zoning ordinance which
prohibited the erection of mobile homes "on private lots in subdi-
visions.'1 2' Interestingly, in interpreting the use of the word subdi-
vision in the zoning ordinance, the court resorted to its definition
in the subdivision ordinance since the word was not defined in the
zoning ordinance.122 This case followed the rule established in
Leak v. Casiti,123 which held that subdivision ordinances do not
overrule a Virginia court's common law jurisdiction to partition
property in kind as long as the resulting subdivision or partition
does not violate valid laws relating to land use.'24
In Hurd v. Watkins, 25 the court held that a parcel marked "re-
served" on a subdivision plat had not been dedicated as a street.
There was no offer of dedication by the subdivider or acceptance
by the local government and thus adjoining landowners could not
establish a right of way through the property through the "re-
served" parcel.
117. Id. at 168, 380 S.E.2d at 921.
118. Id. at 170, 380 S.E.2d at 922.
119. 238 Va. 232, 383 S.E.2d 714 (1989).
120. Id. at 236, 383 S.E.2d at 716.
121. Id. at 235, 383 S.E.2d at 716.
122. Id. at 235-36, 383 S.E.2d at 716.
123. 234 Va. 646, 363 S.E.2d 924 (1988).
124. Id. at 651, 363 S.E.2d at 927.
125. 238 Va. 643, 385 S.E.2d 878 (1989).
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VIII. AFFORDABLE HOUSING
In 1973, the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors acted to ad-
dress a perceived need to provide affordable housing in the county
by adopting legislation which required developers to rent or sell
fifteen percent of the dwelling units in the development to low and
moderate income families below the market rate without any com-
pensation from the county. The supreme court in Fairfax County
v. DeGroff26 held this action to be an unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation. In 1990, the General Assem-
bly attempted to provide authority to Fairfax and other high-
growth counties to require developers to provide affordable hous-
ing units, with compensation, based upon allowing increased den-
sity beyond what would normally be permitted by the zoning dis-
trict.2 ' Moreover, other sections of the Code were amended to
allow comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances to designate ar-
eas for the implementation of measures to promote construction
and maintenance of affordable housing.2 8
Another amendment prohibits discrimination against manufac-
tured housing by requiring that in all agricultural zoning districts
"the placement of manufactured houses that are nineteen or more
feet in width, on a permanent foundation, on individual lots, shall
be permitted.' ' 2 Such houses must comply, however, with devel-
opment standards equivalent to those applicable to conventional
site-built, single-family dwellings within the same zoning
districts. 3 °
Another new section provides that group homes which house
eight or fewer persons in a residential facility for mentally ill, men-
tally retarded or developmentally disabled persons must be treated
in locally adopted zoning ordinances the same as single-family
residences."'
126. 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
127. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.8, -491.9 (Supp. 1990).
128. See id. §§ 15.1-446.1, -447, -489, -489(10), (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
129. Id. § 15.1-486.4 (Supp. 1990).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 15.1-486.3.
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IX. THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE STANDARD
In the case of Barrick v. Board of Supervisors,132 disgruntled
neighbors challenged the action of the Mathews County Board of
Supervisors in rezoning two waterfront parcels from single-lot resi-
dential use to multi-family condominium. Suit was filed alleging
that illegal spot zoning had occurred. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the suit holding that
the Board had produced sufficient evidence of reasonableness to
make the decision "fairly debatable.' ' 33
The Supreme Court of Virginia also applied the fairly debatable
standard in another case, County of Lancaster v. Cowardin'34 and
upheld the county's decision. In this case, however, an attempt was
made to find an exception to the fairly debatable rule where dis-
crimination is alleged. A discrimination argument had been at-
tempted in an earlier case, County Board of Arlington v. Bratic,3 >
where the court applied the fairly debatable rule to sustain the
county's denial of a conditional use permit. Rejecting the equal
protection and discrimination argument, the court in Bratic stated
that "Bratic makes the final point that the denial of his applica-
tion for a use permit was discriminatory, constituting a denial of
equal protection, because the County Board in 1980 and 1984
granted use permits for two-family dwellings in situations similar
to the case at bar.'3 6 The court stated that "a claim of unlawful
discrimination cannot prevail if there is a rational basis for the ac-
tion alleged to be discriminatory.' ' 37 "Here, we think the County
Board's effort to preserve the single-family character of the inte-
rior of the neighborhood provides a rational basis for the denial of
the Bratic's application." '138 In Cowardin, the court held that the
plaintiff's discrimination claim lacked merit because there was a
"rational basis for the Board's action."' 39 Although the Board had
granted one of the plaintiff's neighbors a boathouse permit several
months earlier, the court noted that the neighbor's boathouse was
located on a different tributary of the same river, where there were
132. 239 Va. 628, 391 S.E.2d 318 (1990).
133. Id. at 635-36, 391 S.E.2d at 322.
134. 239 Va. 522, 391 S.E.2d 267 (1990).
135. 237 Va. 221, 377 S.E.2d 368 (1989).
136. Id. at 229, 377 S.E.2d at 372.
137. Id. at 230, 377 S.E.2d at 372.
138. Id.
139. Cowardin, 239 Va. at 526, 391 S.E.2d at 269.
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no boathouses. 40 From an analysis of Cowardin, it is difficult not
to ask the question whether the court has substituted "any" basis
for "rational" basis.
In Ames v. Town of Painter,' the importance of providing a
record in a Board of Zoning appeals ("BZA") case was clearly es-
tablished. The court affirmed the trial court's overturning of a BZA
grant of a special use permit for a migrant labor camp because
there was "no basis" in the record for a reviewing court to deter-
mine whether the fairly debatable standard could be established.'42
X. LAND USE TAXATION
Land enrolled in Virginia's land use assessment program receives
a reduced real property tax assessment.' 4 ' Lots over five acres
which are farmed or forest lots over twenty acres qualify for this
special tax assessment program.'
The subdivision of land which is enrolled in Virginia's special
use assessment program into agricultural lots of less than five acres
or forestal lots of less than twenty acres will result in the assess-
ment of roll-back taxes.' 45
A 1990 amendment to Virginia's minimum acreage requirements
for special use assessments allows a landowner to combine contigu-
ous subdivided lots recorded prior to July 1, 1983, for purposes of
the minimum acreage requirements."'
Furthermore, property rezoned after July 1, 1988, to a more in-
tensive use at the request of the landowner will be subject to roll-
back taxes at the time the zoning is changed. 47 Land rezoned to a
more intensive use prior to July 1, 1988, at the request of the
owner or his agent, however, will only be subject to roll-back taxes
when the property's use is changed to a non-agricultural or non-
forestal use. To avoid the roll-back taxes, a landowner who rezoned
his property prior to 1988 must continue to farm his property for
140. Id.
141. 239 Va. 343, 389 S.E.2d 702 (1990).
142. Id. at 350, 389 S.E.2d at 706.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3230 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
144. Id. § 58.1-3233.
145. Id. § 58.1-3241(A). The minimum acreage requirement does not include an area for
the house site. Accordingly, a lot with a house must exceed the minimum acreage require-
ment (five or twenty acres plus the house site).
146. Id. § 58.1-3234(2).
147. Id. § 58.1-3237(D).
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the next five years before changing to a non-qualifying use.
Even land which is not rezoned or subdivided can be subject to a
roll-back tax simply by a discontinuance of the farm or forestal
use. A commonly held misconception is that if the landowner with-
draws from the land use assessment program and elects to be taxed
at the fair market value assessment, he need not continue to farm
to avoid the roll-back tax. In fact, if he discontinues farming prior
to the five-year grace period, roll-back taxes will be assessed.
XI. IMPACT FEES
The use of proffers and conditional zoning is one method utilized
by local jurisdictions to control development and growth and to
obtain funds for the cost of constructing roads and paying for ser-
vices normally provided by general tax funds. Property which is to
be developed under existing zoning where proffers and conditions
are not authorized, however, does not afford the jurisdictions an
opportunity to obtain these voluntary contributions for improve-
ments and services such as roads, schools and other public facili-
ties. Many localities have argued that residential development does
not generate sufficient local tax base to offset the expenditures
which the residential development will require for governmental
services, such as schools, police and parks. As a result, the argu-
ment goes, existing residents will see their taxes increasing in order
to pay for new services ostensibly generated because of new devel-
opment. High growth jurisdictions have sought to tax or exact
money or services from new developments to pay for those per-
ceived additional costs. In response, the 1989 General Assembly
adopted a road impact fee provision 4" which became effective July
1, 1990.
Impact fees assessed under this legislation are involuntary. In
order to charge such fees, however, the locality must first designate
the areas within which the fees will be collected and estimate the
cost of bringing the road network to a planned standard. Then,
fees for off-site road work can be imposed on developments on a
pro-rata basis if the need for the off-site improvements are gener-
ated by the development itself. This limitation reflects the consti-
tutional constraints on involuntary governmental exactions, such
as impact fees, established in the United States Supreme Court's
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1 -498.1 -.10 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.149 As of this
writing, no locality is known to have yet adopted the impact fee
legislation; but as stated earlier, jurisdictions have asked the Gen-
eral Assembly to expand the permitted uses of those fees beyond
roads to include schools and other public needs. 50 A plausible ex-
planation of why jurisdictions have not moved to adopt road im-
pact fees may be because the statute requires as a condition of its
use that the local jurisdiction conduct an extensive transportation
planning and cost analysis. It must then charge the impact fee on a
pro-rata basis by determining the amount of the cost of new road
improvements for which the development, itself, would generate
the need.
XII. CONCLUSION
Most high-growth jurisdictions have been moderately successful
in dealing with growth management without legislative authority
by obtaining contributions from developers as a condition to the
granting of the desired land use approval. Such exactions, in vogue
during the economic boom of the 1980's, will undoubtedly face
constitutional challenges in the courts in the more austere decade
of the 1990's. Constitutional questions of private property rights
versus local zoning authority are also likely to be a major issue in
the development of growth management strategy during the legis-
lative sessions and in the courts during the next decade.
149. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
150. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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